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AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE SHORT-LIVED 
EXPERIMENT IN DEREGULATION OF 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS 
David B. Ross* 
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY. By 
Julius G. Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne B. Herman. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1976. Pp. xvii, 218. $7.50. 
The recent decision of the National Labor Relations Board 
in General Knit of California, Inc. 1 perpetuates a controversy over 
a monograph by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, en-
titled Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality. In 
General Knit, the Board once again announced its intention to 
overturn representation-election results whenever a winning 
party made substantial misrepresentations which might have sig-
nificantly influenced the election results. The opinion in General 
Knit reinstated the Hollywood Ceramics Co. 2 standard for regu-
lating the content of election campaigns, which the Board had 
abandoned less than two years earlier in Shopping Kart Food 
Market, Inc. 3 
The majority in Shopping Kart had found support for their 
decision that the Board should no longer probe the truth or falsity 
of parties' campaign statements in the research which Professors 
Getman and Goldberg4 later ( with Herman) expanded into their 
present book. The opinion of General Knit's new majority (a ma-
jority composed of Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, who 
both dissented in Shopping Kart, and Member Truesdale, who 
was recently appointed to the Board) accordingly imputed some 
of the blame for the Board's misdirection on its earlier acceptance 
of Getman, Goldberg, and Herman's conclusions. 
The Board's sudden reversal of Shopping Kart can only exac-
erbate the notable instability of Board doctrine in the area of 
union representation elections, although as Professor Bok6 
* Member, Illinois Bar. B.A. 1964, Amherst College; M.A. 1966, University of 
California, Berkeley;· LL.B. 1968, Harvard Univeraity.-Ed. 
1. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978). 
2. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
3. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). 
4. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation 
of Campaign Misrepresentation: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976). 
5. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 40 (1964). 
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pointed out, the frequent changes in Board policy concerning 
campaign regulation probably result from a fundamental uncer-
tainty over the nature of the election process and of voter behav-
ior rather than from shifts in Board politics. Far removed from 
the turmoil of a hotly contested election and unencumbered by 
systematic research into the influences upon elections, the Board 
and the courts normally derive their policies from axioms plucked 
from judicial opinions. Justice Harlan's theory of the "fist-inside-
the-velvet glove"6 or Judge Learned Hand's classic warning on 
ambiguous campaign statements7 are often impossible to apply in 
concrete situations but furnish a conventional wisdom where the 
influence of campaign statements and conduct on voters is un-
known. Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gis-
sel Packing Co. 8 supplies a formula for the Board's regulatory 
inquiries but calls for case-by-case distinctions which probably 
outstrip the Board's assessment powers. 
Professor Bok reasoned in a 1964 article9 (which inspired the 
Getman studies) that campaigns will in many circumstances be 
regulated, by whatever a priori standard, in ignorance of the ends 
achieved. He argued, then, that union campaign regulation may 
serve a dubious purpose, waste agency resources, and may as 
often as not be harmful. 
Against Bok's contention that, given our ignorance of the 
election process, regulation of election conduct might not be pur-
poseful, Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argue for a laissez-faire 
approach based on their research, which suggests that campaign 
conduct, by and large, has little or no influence on voters. Be-
cause they refute rather than merely question the old axioms, 
theirs is a more startling position than Bok's, and it has provoked 
highly critical reactions. Unions and employers, of course, invest 
considerable effort in developing campaign issues, presumably 
because their experience has shown such campaigns to be effec-
tive. And to many practitioners, as well as to the Board, the 
authors' rejection of that experience is unjustified by their data, 
6. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964). 
7. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). 
8. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Under Gissel Packing, the Board may set aside election results 
and order a rerun after finding "minor" unlawful campaign conduct; if it finds unlawful 
campaign conduct extensive or serious enough to make a fair rerun impossible, it may 
order the employer to bargain with the union on the strength of a showing, based on 
authorization cards, that the union at one time had a majority, even though it lost the 
election. 
9. Bok, supra note 5. 
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particularly as to the critical groups of undecided or "switch" 
voters. 
The Challenge to the Board's Model of Voting Behavior 
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman argue that the Board, in its 
decisions requiring pristine "laboratory conditions"10 for all elec-
tions, has developed an erroneous model of employee voting be-
havior. The authors demonstrate that Board decisions character-
ize employees as attentive to campaign issues, unsophisticated in 
labor relations, and easily manipulated by ambiguous statements 
which may be interpreted as threats or promises. Getman, Gold-
berg, and Herman challenge this view. They analyzed thirty-one 
elections (which were especially selected for the vigor of the em-
ployer's campaign), and intervi~wed (twice) 1,239 employees 
(p.33).11 Their data suggest that voters in a representation cam-
paign have strong and stable predispositions which depend on 
their attitudes toward unions and on their own working condi-
tions. Eighty-one percent of the surveyed employees voted in ac-
cord with those predispositions (p. 62). Indeed, even unlawful 
campaign tactics, which occurred in twenty-two of the elections, 
did not alter pre-campaign attitudes (pp. 115-16). 
Relying on psychological and behavioral theories, the au-
thors contend that these pre-campaign attitudes make up a 
"cognitive structure" through which campaign propaganda is fil-
tered and assimilated and that the attitudes can not be easily 
changed by new information. Employees inclined to vote for the 
union expect the company to campaign against the union and 
discount its arguments (pp. 85-86, 124 n.20). In fact, both union 
and company supporters are largely inattentive to the campaign; 
on the average they recalled only ten percent of the company 
issues and seven percent of the union issues (pp. 75-76). 
According to the authors, then, the high correlation between 
employees' pre-campaign attitudes and their votes refutes the 
Board's model of voter behavior and casts doubt on its require-
ment of "laboratory conditions." This conclusion is strongly sup-
ported by the statistical analysis and probably does not contra-
dict the experience of most practitioners, however skeptical some 
commentators and the Board may be. The study's implication is 
10. E.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
11. The first interview was held an average of eleven days after the direction of an 
election, which is early in normal campaigns but not entirely before the campaign begins, 
The second interview was held immediately after the election. 
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unavoidable: the Board should not substantially regulate the con-
tent of campaigns, at least in elections where the margin of vic-
tory exceeds twenty percent. 
Influence of Campaigns on the Undecided or "Switch" Voter 
We have seen that eighty-one percent of the voters studied 
followed their predisposition. The study's principal problem lies 
in its treatment of the remaining nineteen perc~nt - the six 
percent who were undecided voters and who expressed no pre-
campaign intent and the thirteen percent who "switched" to vote 
contrary to their original intent. As the authors note, these voters, 
although few in number, determined the outcome in nine (or 
twenty-nine percent) of the thirty-one elections {p. 103). 
The authors reached the following conclusions about the 
undecided and "switch" voters· {pp. 103-08): 
(1) The undecided and switch voters who ultimately voted 
for the company were no more familiar with the company's cam-
paign than such voters who ultimately voted for the union, nor 
were they more familiar with the company's campaign than the 
employees who had originally intended to vote for the company 
and did. 
(2) The undecided and switch voters who ultimately voted 
for the union were significantly more familiar with the union's 
campaign than such voters who ultimately voted for the com-
pany. They were not, however, more familiar with the union's 
campaign than the employees who originally intended to vote for 
the union and did. 
(3) A large majority of the undecided and switch voters 
voted for the company. More specifically, fourteen percent of all 
the voters may have been influenced by the company campaign 
and only five percent by the union campaign. 
( 4) Neither the "undecideds" nor the "switchers" were very 
familiar with either campaign. 
Since the authors collected no data that could identify when 
the new voting intentions emerged, they can only speculate about 
the causal relationship between the union campaign and union 
vote by the undecided and switch voters. Nevertheless, they do 
conjecture that union campaign information won the new pro-
union votes, since "[a] change in those attitudes during the brief 
campaign period without some new information about the Union 
seems unlikely" {p. 106). 
Although logic suggests that the pro-company votes by the 
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undecided and switch voters should be similarly attributed to the 
company's campaign, the authors' data were inconclusive. They 
could not discover any company campaign issues that changed 
attitudes, even when the company used coercive tactica, nor 
could they say that those who voted for the company were famil-
iar with the company's campaign. Instead, they conjecture that 
any company campaign, whatever its content, because it typi-
cally occurs after the union has campaigned unopposed for au-
thorization cards, demonstrates tha:t management is aware of 
employee dissatisfactions and that that is enough to make em-
ployees reconsider their pro-union attitudes (p. 108). 
The conclusion that company campaign issues do not influ-
ence undecided or switch voters certainly conflicts with the 
collective experience of most practitioners, who generally believe 
that in close elections issues make a difference. Moreover, if the 
authors may speculate that union campaign information caused 
five percent of all the voters to support the union, may not the 
Board in General Knit similarly speculate that company cam-
paign information caused the fourteen percent who were unde-
cided or were switch voters to vote against the union? Indeed, the 
Board finds support for its view in the authors' conclusion that 
the mere existence of a company campaign may influence voters 
since, as it asks "[H]ow could the employer's campaign have 
been free of factual assertions?"12 That the authors could not 
identify any campaign issues that changed attitudes does not 
mean that such issues had no effect. 
The authors missed the significance of campaign issues be-
cause they did not design their field investigations to focus pri-
marily on the undecided and switch voter. They only categorized 
voters initially as pro-union, pro-company, or undecided, and 
they did not measure in depth the strength and characteristics of 
voter attitudes. Indeed, they only asked seven questions about 
working conditions, and they limited answers to a three-point 
scale: satisfied, dissatisfied, or uncertain. Employee attitudes 
toward the union were also scored on a three-point scale: agree, 
disagree, and don't know or uncertain. 
In short, the authors' attitude survey was not designed to 
reveal deep-seated but unarticulated feelings; and in fairness, 
their limited time resources made it difficult to do so. Thus, for 
example, the data showing that most employees feel that wage 
12. General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 11 n.24, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687, 
1690 n.24 (1978). 
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issues are more important than job security issues contradicts the 
experience of practitioners that issues of job security are far more 
important than issues of wages. These doubts about whether the 
attitude survey revealed employee attitudes and adequately 
probed the cause of changed attitudes plus the authors' failure to 
test the attitudes on at least one more occasion prior to the elec-
tion - to learn how new attitudes develop over time - make 
questionable the authors' conclusion that switching to the com-
pany is "more likely to be due to the intensification of currently 
held attitudes than to new information conveyed in the em-
ployer's campaign" (p. 145). 
Effect of Unlawful Campaigning on Undecided and Switch Voters 
The authors suggest that even unlawfully coercive employer 
campaigns do not significantly influence the voting decisions of 
a large majority of employees. Again, however, the critical ques-
tion persists about the influence of coercive campaigning on the 
undecided or switch voters, most of whom voted against the 
union. Despite the authors' inability to identify why the unde-
cided or switch voters change their attitudes, the authors did, by· 
isolating and comparing the effects of "clean" and coercive cam-
paigns, persuasively show that the percentage of undecided voters 
who voted for the company and the percentage of voters who 
switched from pro-union to pro-company were not significantly 
greater in unlawful elections than in "clean" elections. They also 
concluded that the small percentage of voters influenced by cam-
paign misconduct made a bargaining order an inappropriate rem-
edy (pp. 115-16). 
What makes these results particularly convincing is the au-
thors' corroborating analysis of voter perception of unlawful tac-
tics. Approximately one third of the employees reported that the 
employer had used one or more unlawful campaign· tactics, 
whether or not unlawful campaigning actually occurred. Reports 
of unlawful conduct were not even more frequent when the con-
duct was coercive enough to merit a bargaining remedy order {pp. 
117-18).13 Thus, because voters believe unlawful tactics occur and 
13. To isolate the variables of unlawful and seriously unlawful campaign tactics, the 
authors took both the election cases in which official charges were lodged and the cases 
in which no charges were filed. They asked an experienced administrative law judge (who 
was, of course, acting unofficially) to decide whether or not a valid objection might have 
been raised to the campaign and the materials used in it. The judge also determined 
whether a bargaining order would have been appropriate. 
Under Board standards, there were campaign violations in twenty-one of the thirty-
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perhaps expect them, voters are not influenced when they do in 
fact occur. 
Conclusion 
Even though Getman, Goldberg, and Herman have persua-
sively shown that most pre-election attitudes are stable, they will 
probably not dissuade companies from attempting to identify and 
influence their employees' attitudes toward the company and the 
union. Moreover, the study has also clearly failed to persuade the 
Board, at least for the time being, to limit regulating campaign 
conduct. The authors' most valuable contribution may be their 
use of empirical research and analysis to make the debate about 
Board regulation of election campaigns better informed and more 
rational. The authors' definition and isolation of variables, their 
logical experimental design and careful data collection, and their 
use of statistical tools to interpret those data produce meaningful 
results that can be challenged or verified. Their data raise further 
questions but expand our understanding about the extent to 
which Board regulation is appropriate. 
one elections. Since the identification of unlawful conduct was wholly uncorrelated with 
the perception of unlawful tactics by the voters, the authors reasonably question whether 
or not Board investigations and findings are necessary. 
